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The Prime Time Access Rule: Six
Commandments for Inept Regulation
by THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER*
In 1908, Fred Merkle cost the New York Giants a National
League pennant when he failed to touch second base on what
would otherwise have been a game-winning hit by Al Bridwell.1
If the history of television network regulation contains a mis-
take analogous to "Merkle's Boner," it would be the Federal
Communications Commission's prime time access rule.2 Both
Merkle's Boner and the prime time access rule demonstrate
what can happen if you do not keep your mind in the game and
your eye on the main target.
I
The FCC and the Networks
No aspect of the economic structure and behavior of the com-
mercial television industry has engaged the Federal Communi-
cations Commission's (FCC) attention more fully than the roles
of the television networks. Beginning in 1946, and with almost
clock-like regularity about every ten years thereafter, the FCC
has either adopted major regulations of the networks' organiza-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to many
people who, whether or not agreeing with the thesis of this article, have generously
offered most helpful comments on an earlier draft. These include Stanley M. Besen,
Ronald A. Cass, Bruce M. Owen, L.A. Powe, Glen 0. Robinson, Steven C. Salop,
Thomas L. Schuessler, and Louis M. Seidman. Among this distinguished and selfless
group, it would be unfair not to single out Professor Schuessler for his very patient,
sustained assistance.
1. See G. FLEMING, THE UNFORGETrABLE SEASON 243-55, 293-321 (1981). The
Cubs and Giants played on September 23, 1908. With the score tied in the bottom of
the ninth, the Giants had Merkle on first base, Harry "Moose" McCormick on third,
and Bridwell at bat with two outs. Bridwell hit cleanly to center, McCormick crossing
the plate. But the Cubs realized Merkle never ran all the way to second base. They
retrieved the ball and stepped on second. Merkle was out and, because the play was a
force-out, McCormick's run did not score. The riot that ensued prevented the game
from being finished and it was declared a tie. The Giants and Cubs finished the sea-
son with identical records and on October 8, the Cubs beat the Giants, 4-2, at the Polo
Grounds in a make-up for the tied game. Id.
2. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1983).
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tion and commercial practices or launched major studies pre-
sumptively directed at generating further regulations of these
topics.'
The extent of the Commission's interest in the networks is
unsurprising, for historically, ABC, CBS, and NBC have domi-
nated the commercial television industry.4 Each network is af-
filiated with over two hundred local commercial television
stations and can reach over ninety-six percent of all United
States television households.' In comparison, nonaffiliated or
"independent" stations number only about 250,6 many of which
broadcast largely religious programming,7 and at least one-
3. In 1946, the Commission extended its rules regulating radio network affilia-
tion practices to television networks. See Rules Governing Standard and High Fre-
quency Broadcast Stations, 11 Fed. Reg. 33-40 (1946). In 1957, the Commission
completed a study of the commercial relationships between television networks and
their affiliates. See NETWORK BROADCASTING, REPORT OF THE NETWORK STUDY STAFF
TO THE NETWORK STUDY COMMITTEE (Oct. 1957), reprinted in REPORT OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958) (frequently described as "The Barrow Report"). During the 1960's the
FCC conducted extensive surveys of the networks' program procurement practices.
See Television Network Program Procurement, Second Interim Report (Part I), Of-
fice of Network Study, reprinted as TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT,
REPORT OF COMMITrEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 281,
88th Cong., 1st Sess (1962), and FCC, SECOND INTERIM REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NET-
WORK STUDY, TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, PART 11 (1965). These
reports provided the background for the prime time access rule discussed in this arti-
cle. See In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations With
Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, Re-
port and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PTAR I]. The Commis-
sion announced the latest of its major network studies in 1977. See Commercial
Television Network Practices, Notice of Inquiry in PR Docket No. 21049, 42 Fed. Reg.
4992 (released Jan. 14, 1977). See also Commercial Television Network Practices, Fur-
ther Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. 21049, 43 Fed. Reg. 50,126 (released Oct. 20, 1978).
The author served as co-director of the group selected to conduct these studies. That
group issued its final report in 1980. See 1 FCC, NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF,
NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION
(1980) [hereinafter cited as NEW TV NETWORKS I]. For an explanation of the various
rules generated by the various FCC studies since 1946, see S. BESEN, T. KRAT-
TENMAKER, A. METZGER & J. WOODBURY, MISREGULATING TELEVISION: NETWORK
DOMINANCE AND THE F.C.C. 31-49 (1984) [hereinafter cited as MISREGULATING
TELEVISION].
4. See 2 FCC, NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS:
ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 65-104 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
NEW TV NETWORKS II]. ABC, of course, did not achieve rough parity with CBS and
NBC until the 1960's. Id. at 84-93.
5. See Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Net-
works: The Federal Communications Commission's Spectrum Management Policies,
54 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 878-79, 981 (1981).
6. See 1984 Broadcasting Cablecasting Yearbook A-2.
7. See Lacey, The Electric Church: An FCC Established Institution?, 31 FED.
COM. L.J. 235 (1980) and sources cited therein.
PRIME TIME ACCESS RULE
third of all TV households receive no independent station over
the air.8 For the month of December 1983, ABC, CBS, and NBC
captured eighty percent of the prime time television viewing
audience,9 and in 1979 these firms and their affiliates accounted
for about ninety percent of both the revenues and profits of the
United States television industry.'0
ABC, CBS, and NBC are powerful, indeed. Therefore, the
persistent impulse to engraft further regulations on network
behavior is, in a sense, understandable; no one, except of course
the networks, favors prolonged dominance of the television in-
dustry and TV viewers by such a small group of very large
firms. In another sense, however, the decennial rule-writing
ritual is puzzling, because one would expect the Commission, at
some point, to question whether, if past regulation of the domi-
nant networks' commercial behavior has not diminished their
power, more regulations are likely to do so.
Others have asked that question and found that it has a
rather clear answer. In fact, network dominance is due to two
factors that no behavioral regulation can alter.
First, networking creates scale economies that are un-
matched by any other method of creating, producing, and dis-
tributing television programs for viewers to watch." In
particular, a full-scale national network can spend more money
to produce or acquire a program than a less widely distributed
alternative, yet incur less cost per viewer in doing so.' 2 In addi-
tion, that network usually enjoys substantial economies from
broadcasting throughout much of the day and across the
week.'3 Consequently, in head-to-head competition for viewers
or advertisers, network programs will almost always beat non-
network programs. The dominance of networks over non-
networks is due to an economic law that no Commission
regulation can annul, repeal, or suspend.
Second, the FCC in 1952 adopted a spectrum allocation plan
that (perhaps\' to the agency's surprise) assured that no more
than three over-the-air networks could arise.' 4 Subsequently,
8. See Schuessler, supra note 5, at 983-84.
9. See CABLE TV ADVERT. 4 (Feb. 22, 1984).
10. See FCC, TV BROADCAST FINANCIAL DATA-1980.
11. See NEW TV NETWORKS II, supra note 4, at 217-30.
12. Id
13. See MISREGULATING TELEVISION, supra note 3, at 5-7.
14. See generally Schuessler, supra note 5; see also MISREGULATING TELEVISION,
supra note 3, at 12-16. Additional conventional full-scale networks could arise, with-
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the FCC actively retarded the growth of new technologies-es-
pecially subscription, cable, and low power television-fully
aware that this regulation would protect a three-and-only-three
network system.15 Hence, the dominance of the three net-
works was established.
This skeptical view of the FCC's ability to promote diversity
and increase competition by regulating the commercial prac-
tices of ABC, CBS, and NBC-a view long held by many schol-
ars -- is now professed by the Commission itself.' There is a
growing recognition that the dominant networks are overregu-
lated-that many rules were adopted in the mistaken belief
that increased competition among and against networks could
be stimulated by novel restrictions on the dominant networks'
commercial practices.
Thus, the Commission recently set about to "de-regulate" tel-
evision networks, i.e., to repeal regulations that hinder net-
works' abilities to operate efficiently without furthering
viewers' interests in competition or diversity. As a first step,
the FCC set out to scrap its rule prohibiting networks from
owning cable systems ("network-cable cross-ownership
rule").8 The agency also proposed allowing the dominant net-
works to purchase from their program suppliers the right to
share in revenues earned by network programs when sold for
broadcast abroad or on United States stations outside the net-
work schedule after their network run has ended ("syndication
rule").19
out changes in the 1952 plan, if tremendous increases occur in advertiser demand for
commercial time and in the technical quality of UHF broadcast reception. In addition
to the foregoing sources, see R. PARK, NEW TELEVISION NETwORKS: AN UPDATE
(1980), reprinted in NEW TV NETWORKS I, supra note 3, at 143-84.
15. See NEW TV NETWORKS I, supra note 3, at 58-64, 95-120. See also MISREGULAT-
ING TELEVISION, supra note 3, at 11-19; Besen & Krattenmaker, Regulating Network
Television: Dubious Premises and Doubtful Solutions, REG. 27, 32-34 (May/June
1981).
16. See, e.g., NEW TV NETWORKS II, supra note 4, at 515-39.
17. See Amendment of the Commission's Syndication and Financial Interest Rule,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in BC Docket No. 82-345, FCC 82-300, 47 Fed. Reg.
32,959 (1982) (proposal to delete syndication and financial interest rules).
18. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a)(1) (1983). See Cross-Ownership Rules, Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making, 91 F.C.C.2d 76 (1982).
19. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1983). See In re Amendment of the Commission's Syndi-
cation and Financial Interest Rule, Notice of Proposed Rule Making in BC Docket No.
82-345, FCC 82-300, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,959 (1982); Tentative Decision and Request for
Further Comments in BC Docket No. 82-345 (Aug. 12, 1983). The tentative decision
was suspended when President Reagan announced that he opposed repeal. See Gang-
ing up on the networks refin-syn, BROADCASTING, Nov. 7,1983, at 31-35. The proposal
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A logical candidate for the next regulation to be repealed is
the prime time access rule.2" The rule, described in more detail
below, prevents the dominant networks from programming one
of the four prime time hours each evening unless certain "meri-
torious" programs are offered. This commentary will explain
why that rule should, indeed, be the FCC's next target.
II
The Prime Time Access Rule: A Short Primer
To understand the mechanism of the prime time access rule,
one should be versed in certain industry terminology. The
rule's provisions follow the convention of classifying television
programs according to the manner in which they are
distributed.2'
A "network" program is broadcast by simultaneous intercon-
nection of several stations, via microwave or satellite, which
can, in turn, simultaneously broadcast to households.22 Particu-
larly during prime time, the best known providers of network
programs-ABC, CBS, and NBC-follow a common pattern.
They distribute, via microwave to affiliated stations, programs
produced for and licensed to the networks by Hollywood film
studios or west coast firms that specialize in TV program
production.23
A "syndicated" program is licensed directly to stations,
rather than to a network, by the firm that owns the program's
exhibition rights.24 The film or tape is usually mailed to TV
stations and stations usually determine when to exhibit it. The
program is an "off-network syndicated program" if it was for-
merly exhibited on a network (e.g., reruns of "Leave It to Bea-
would also have repealed the so-called "financial interest rule," which forbids the net-
works from other forms of profit-sharing in independently produced programs, but
that rule had already been gutted by a Commission decision rendering it a mere ad-
junct of the syndication rule. See Declaratory Ruling on Section 73.658(j)(1)(ii), 87
F.C.C.2d 30 (1981).
20. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1983).
21. See NEW TV NETWORKS II, supra note 4, at 321-23.
22. See FCC, NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, VIDEO INTERCONNECTION: TECH-
NOLOGY, COSTS AND REGULATORY POLICIES (1980).
23. See NEW TV NETWORKS II, supra note 4, at 327-80. The dominant networks
occasionally produce a small number of prime time entertainment series themselves,
although they are presently limited in this regard by antitrust consent decrees. See
i& at 683, 697-700. They may also produce news, documentary, or sports programs
that are scheduled in prime time.
24. Id. at 321.
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ver").25 If the program was produced to be licensed initially to
stations, it is denominated "first-run syndicated" fare (e.g.,
"The People's Court").26
Finally, "local" programming is produced for one station
only, usually by that station itself.2 7 In short, the method of
distribution determines whether a program is characterized as
a "network," "syndicated," or "local" program.
The FCC's prime time access rule (conveniently, if not ele-
gantly, PTAR) forbids television stations affiliated with ABC,
CBS, and NBC from broadcasting certain programs. Specifi-
cally, during the four prime time evening hours (7 p.m. to 11
p.m. EST) affiliates may not exhibit more than three hours of
entertainment programs aimed at adult audiences and pro-
duced for ABC, CBS, or NBC.28 Thus, the rule restricts the ex-
tent to which affiliates may exhibit network and off-network
syndicated programs (indeed, it also restricts motion pictures
formerly licensed for network exhibition), but not local or first-
run syndicated programs.
PTAR, then, prevents viewers from watching certain pro-
grams, regardless of their content or appeal, at a certain time,
solely because of the identity of those engaged in their produc-
tion or acquisition. For example, "Hee Haw" counts against the
three-hour limit if the particular tape was made in the 1960's
when that program was produced for exhibition on CBS. A
"Hee-Haw" tape made in the 1970's is not counted, however, for
the program was then not on any network schedule but was in
first-run syndication.29 If the unclean hands of a network cen-
sor, distributor, or purchasing agent have touched the program,
it is excluded from an hour of prime time unless, as described
25. Id. at 322.
26. Id. at 321-22.
27. Id. at 323.
28. Technically, the rule applies only to affiliates in the 50 largest television mar-
kets. Practically, this has made it uneconomical for ABC, CBS, and NBC to program
(except via the exceptions for certain "merit" programming) at all for one hour of
prime time because the viewer base is too small, outside the top 50 markets, to support
expensive programming. But affiliates outside the top 50 markets remain able to
broadcast off-network programs.
The rule itself does not specify which portions of the 7-11 p.m. slot the networks
must vacate. Indeed, the networks were usually programming only 3-1/2 hours of the
7-11 p.m. slot at the time PTAR was adopted. See PTAR I, supra note 3, para. 22. The
Commission chairman, however, told the networks to abandon the 7-8 p.m. hour. See
Letter of Dean Burch, Mar. 11, 1971, reprinted in RAD. REG. (P&F) (1971). In that
fashion, the networks achieved uniformity without overt private collusion.
29. See NEW TV NETWORKS II, supra note 4, at 401 n.92.
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below, the content or format of the program is particularly fa-
vored by the Commission. If its ancestry is nonnetwork, the
program is welcome to access time regardless of its content, for-
mat, or subject matter.
III
Criticizing PTAR: On What Terms?
The peculiar structure of PTAR makes it particularly diffi-
cult to critique the rule. For example, is PTAR-like a ban on
exhibitions of nudity-meant to express a judgment of moral or
aesthetic outrage against the dominant networks? Is PTAR
"good" if network programs are "evil" or "unsuitable viewing
fare" even though people would likely choose to watch them?
If so, then the rule is not amenable to any kind of critical, ob-
jective analysis.
Proponents of PTAR, however, do not purport to defend the
rule on moral or aesthetic grounds. We do not mean to stigma-
tize networks, they say, even if it may appear that way. The
rule is, in truth, designed to foster a healthier, more competi-
tive television industry that offers greater diversity and free-
dom of choice. 0 These proponents assert that the rule is an
instrumental tool of regulatory policy toward broadcasting,
designed to achieve certain pragmatic, beneficial effects in in-
dustry behavior or structure, and not to educate viewers or to
save them from themselves. PTAR is not wise because net-
works are (or should be) pariahs. PTAR is good because it im-
proves the industry's organization and commercial
performance.
31
That sort of contention can be analyzed by critical, objective
means. But the claim raises suspicions. Why should FCC com-
missioners seek such a goal? What is in it for them besides the
putative satisfaction that may arise from believing that one has
followed an abstract goal whose attainment brings no personal,
30. See, e.g., PTAR I, supra note 3, paras. 22-26.
31. Cynics may sigh. A rule that forbids network affiliates in the top 50 markets
to broadcast reruns of the "Lawrence Welk Show" (because those programs were pro-
duced for ABC), but permits them to air 1970's reruns of the same series (because
these programs were made to be sold partially to advertisers, then bartered to stations
via syndication), certainly appears to rest on a bias against programs because of their
sources. Taking PTAR proponents at their word, however, the rule is not simply an
expression of moral indignation or the product of a frustrated urge to do something
(anything?) that will show the network who's boss, but is an attempt to improve the
national well-being. See id.
No. 1]
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material reward? The literature on why regulators behave as
they do32 is sufficiently developed that we should not blush to
ask a regulator who asserts, "I acted to improve the industry's
ability to perform in the public interest" whether it would not
be more accurate to say, "I acted to advance my own conception
of my well-being and then justified that action publicly by in-
voking public interest criteria."
Perhaps, from a commissioner's standpoint, the critical issue
with respect to the prime time access rule is whether it furthers
his or her self-interests. If so, the issue raises the questions of
why a majority of commissioners at three separate times in the
1970's perceived it to be personally beneficial to vote for
PTAR33 and what, if anything, might induce a change in those
perceptions.
These questions are addressed briefly at the conclusion of
this commentary. 4 But this does not explain why we should
care about PTAR if we are not commissioners (or aesthetic cru-
saders against network programs per se). To do so requires that
we return (at least publicly) to the professed reasons for the
rule: that it will improve the industry's economic structure and
performance.
To summarize, someone who supports the prime time access
rule may believe the rule is good because it prevents viewers,
for an hour of prime time, from exercising a choice that should
be aesthetically unpalatable, or would be morally harmful, to
them. I disregard such arguments because they cannot be sub-
jected to any objective analysis and they are not commonly of-
fered, at least publicly, as justifications for PTAR. A second
reason for supporting PTAR is that it is in one's own private
self-interest to do so. As explained below, this position does in
fact help to explain why the rule was promulgated and why it
has yet to be repealed. It does not, however, explain why the
rule furthers the public interest. A third general argument is
32. See, e.g., Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.
LAW & ECON. 211 (1976).
33. PTAR I, supra note 3; In re Consideration of the Operation of, and Possible
Changes in, the "Prime Time Access Rule," Section 73.658(k), of the Commission's
Rules, Report and Order, 44 F.C.C.2d 1081 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PTAR II); In re
Consideration of the Operation of, and Possible Changes in, the Prime Time Access
Rule, § 73.658(k) of the Commission's Rules, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d
829 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PTAR III].
34. See infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
[Vol. 7
PRIME TIME ACCESS RULE
that the rule will improve the ability of the television industry
to perform in the public interest or will increase the likelihood
that it will do so. That argument is the principal target of this
critique because it is the only type of argument that both ex-
plains why one should favor retention of PTAR (unless broad-
cast regulation should consist solely of that which furthers the
self-interests of commissioners and members of the industry)
and is subject to rational debate.3
IV
PTAR: A Parody of Regulation
Viewed as an instrument of economic regulatory policy to-
ward television networks, the prime time access rule is so mis-
guided as to be a virtual parody of the kind of commercial
regulation described in the Communications Act of 1934.36
That statute, the charter of the Federal Communications Com-
mission, directs the agency to "encourage the larger and more
effective use of radio' 37 and to gauge the utility of its efforts by
whether it promotes "the public interest.
38
To catalogue, by these standards, the regulatory mistakes un-
derlying PTAR is to create a set of principles for regulators'
behavior that, if followed carefully, provide a tidy guide for
generating inefficacious regulations with a cosmetic appeal that
wards off contentions that nothing has been done or that the
wrong thing has been done about a serious problem. The seri-
ous problem is a tightly knit, firmly entrenched, three-firm oli-
gopoly in the business of networking. The inefficacious
cosmetic is the prime time access rule. The guide followed by
the FCC to get from that problem to its nonsolution consists of
six simple Commandments for inept regulation. These Com-
mandments, not necessarily in the order of their gravity, are:
1. First draft the rule, then establish its purpose. Following
this Commandment will prevent any serious inquiry into the
wisdom or utility of your rule. Eventually, the rule can take on
a life of its own, unaffected by any analysis of its implications.
To render an unworkable rule invulnerable to direct attack,
35. For a more extensive discussion of the proper criteria by which to assess FCC
regulations of commercial television network behavior and structure, see MISREGU.
LATING TELEVISION, supra note 3, at 21-30.
36. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1982).
38. 47 U.S.C. § 303. See also supra note 35.
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the regulator could do no better than to mimic the FCC's elabo-
rate four-step method of obeying this Commandment.
First, the agency promulgated PTAR without undertaking a
single empirical study of whether the rule would achieve any
measurable economic effect.39 Then, in adopting the rule the
Commission asserted it would make available to stations prime
time quality programs from sources other than ABC, CBS, and
NBC.4" When this objective naturally proved to be unattaina-
ble by that rule, the FCC simply invented a new purpose for
PTAR: to increase the amount of locally-produced programs
broadcast by network affiliates.41 Further, realizing that the
rule was likely to generate more syndicated than local pro-
gramming, PTAR's proponents devised yet another purpose,
one that is at least clearly attainable. The purpose is now said
to be to increase the amount of first-run syndicated
programming.4
Thus, we now understand that the purpose of PTAR is to ex-
ist. And because its existence is undeniable, its wisdom is
thereby clear. Of course, we are given no reason to believe that
television viewers are better off simply because more first-run
syndicated programming is produced,43 but the whole point of
obeying this Commandment is to make it impossible to force
39. The networks, on the other hand, commissioned extensive studies by Arthur
D. Little, Inc. See PTAR I, supra note 3, para. 2. The FCC was not moved. Its "em-
pirical" work consisted solely of gathering data about the number and types of TV
programs produced and their method of distribution. No attempt was made to study
the economic calculus that governs a station's decision to air a program or a network's
choice to purchase one. Cf. NEW TV NETWORKS II, supra note 4, at 106-809.
40. See Schuessler, FCC Regulation of the Network Television Program Procure-
ment Process: An Attempt to Regulate the Laws of Economics?, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 227,
287 (1978) and sources cited therein. See also PTAR I, supra note 3, para. 24 (stating
the issue as whether "program producers ... can and will supply programs for the
syndication market reasonably competitive with network prime time offerings," and
concluding the "likelihood that independent production will succeed is sufficiently
great ... that it should be given an opportunity").
41. See PTAR III, supra note 33, para. 15. Cf. PTAR I, supra note 3, at 397 (sug-
gesting in a virtual throw-away line that licensees might opt for local rather than
syndicated programming).
42. See PTAR III, supra note 33, para. 16.
43. The Commission did state that "it is definitely in the public interest to en-
courage the development of a body of new (not repeat) programs outside of the net-
work process, and thus provide an opportunity for the development of new program
approaches and ideas." PTAR III, supra note 33, para. 16. This statement does not
explain (1) why it is in the public interest to develop new program approaches and
ideas that viewers would not choose to watch, if given the choice, or (2) why network
affiliates are likely to react differently to new program approaches and ideas than are
their networks. Perhaps the FCC had evidence, which it chose not to disclose, that
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you to answer such questions. (The next Commandment helps,
too.)
It is as though the Department of Agriculture required that
one-quarter of all butter sold in the United States be pink.
Such a regulation, if justified later as a measure to increase the
amount of pink butter, would be wondrously wise. The subse-
quent justification not only makes quite plain that the rule
works (witness all the pink butter now produced and sold) but
also renders quite irrelevant the question whether consumers
benefit from pink butter-while leaving regulators the snappy
rejoinder, "Well, they have more choices now, don't they?"
2. Fashion the rule to achieve a multiplicity of inconsistent
objectives. No regulation that seeks to achieve both x and non-
x simultaneously can work. But neither should anyone object
to it, because all are supposed to profit from it. PTAR is so
riddled with exceptions (and exceptions to those exceptions)
that one must wonder exactly what its proponents seek. Yet,
one cannot criticize them for failing to implement any sug-
gested policy goal because they are all in there. In this manner,
regulators can regulate for the sake of regulating while avoid-
ing arguments that a sinister purpose can be inferred from the
text of the rule.
Suppose one initially takes seriously any or all of the most
commonly proffered justifications for PTAR described above-
that the rule is to (1) make available from nonnetwork sources
prime time quality programs, (2) stimulate local program pro-
duction and (3) foster a healthy, competitive first-run syndica-
tion industry. When these objectives are compared with
PTAR's inclusions and exclusions, a series of circular contra-
dictions appears.
Thanks to the syndication rule,44 an abundance of prime time
quality fare is available from nonnetwork sources. All off-net-
work syndicated programming produced in the past twelve
years is controlled exclusively by firms other than ABC, CBS,
and NBC. Yet it cannot be aired under the access rule, even
though it is prime time quality programming offered by a non-
the networks are uninterested in seeking to please either TV viewers or their
affiliates.
44. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1983). The material portions of the rule prevent ABC,
CBS, and NBC from engaging in syndication within the United States or obtaining




network source. Perhaps this is to foster local programming?
No, the rule permits first-run syndicated fare so that no pro-
gramming whose costs can be spread over only one station's
city is likely to survive the competition. 5 Well then, perhaps
the point is to foster first-run syndication? That's difficult to
believe, because the rule exempts children's programming.46
Maybe that is only to allow certain socially desirable network
programming to escape PTAR? If so, it is very difficult to ac-
count for the exceptions for the Rose Bowl and the Olympics.
4 7
Surely no one believes that only ABC, CBS, and NBC have the
expertise necessary to produce a telecast of a football game or a
track meet.
This welter of conflicting interests produced a singularly ger-
rymandered provision concerning informational broadcasts
under PTAR. A network newscast does not count against the
three-hour per night limit on network fare if it: (1)(a) is no
more than half an hour long and (b) follows a local news or
public affairs program at least one hour long;48 or (2)(a) is a
special news program dealing with a fast-breaking news event
49
or (b) is a public affairs or documentary program.50 Appar-
ently, (1)(a) springs from a simple desire to limit the size of
network schedules per se; (1)(b) reflects the desire to foster lo-
cal programming; (2)(a) responds to the impracticality of (1)(a)
in that no one, not even a cosmetic regulator, could expect in-
dependent syndicated news outfits to arise that would cover
such events as hostage crises for one hour of prime time when-
ever crises arose; (2)(b) arises, like the exemption for children's
programming, from the desire to engage in social engineering
while regulating network conduct-if the networks want to es-
cape PTAR, let them produce programming identical to that on
PBS.
Whatever goal anyone thinks the FCC should pursue in regu-
lating networks is reflected somewhere in the rule as a whole
and again within PTAR's particular treatment of informational
programming.5' But, of course, if one does not believe the FCC
45. See NEW TV NETWORKS II, supra note 4, at 219-21, 319-443.
46. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k)(1) (1983). This exemption, however is not available on
Saturdays. Id.
47. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k)(6) (1983).
48. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k)(3) (1983).
49. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k)(2) (1983).
50. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k)(1) (1983).
51. See also PTAR III, supra note 33, at 891 (Commissioner Robinson, dissenting):
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should espouse such goals, other provisions of the general rule
(and of its specific application to programs produced by the net-
works' news departments) also reject those goals. So why
should anyone object?
By fashioning the rule to achieve a multiplicity of inconsis-
tent objectives, the regulator may now assert that PTAR is a
model of statesmanship, a careful balancing of competing inter-
ests motivated by the single goal of balancing competing inter-
ests. What more could one ask of a regulation, inept or adept?
Who but a zealot or a grouch will complain that to treat balanc-
ing competing interests as a goal, rather than as a technique, is
merely to regulate for the sake of regulating?
3. Measure the public interest by the industry's financial
well-being. Obeying the first two Commandments can produce
a regulatory headache. Suppose someone demands that the
rule be evaluated and is not satisfied with the previous answers
that PTAR exists and that it accommodates many diverse inter-
ests. Rather, the inquisitor wants to know how the rule makes
things better rather than simply different?
The Third Commandment teaches that one should then
study the effects of the rule on those subjected to it. If they are
better off, then the rule serves the public interest. If a pink
butter rule increases the profitability of producing butter, the
rule serves the public interest.
The prime time access rule fares very well under this analy-
sis. Contrary to their expectations when the rule was promul-
gated,5 2 network affiliates have prospered under PTAR. 3 The
rule enables them to cut their costs by more than it reduces
their revenues. Programming costs are reduced because each
network affiliate knows that its principal rivals, the other affili-
ates in its market, are restrained from competing for viewers
by offering more expensive network quality programs. Reve-
nues have not declined proportionately because, as it turns out,
enough viewers are sufficiently interested in programs that can
be broadcast under PTAR that they watch those rather than
"The access rule is retained-but so too are most of the waivers .... There appears
to be no recognition that each part of the. . . rule undercuts the other."
52. Most network affiliates opposed the rule, although many of their formal com-
ments were directed to a version proposed but not promulgated by the FCC. PTAR I,
supra note 3, at 403 app.
53. See PTAR: key to survival for local TV stations, BROADCASTING, Feb. 15, 1982,
at 26. Network affiliates have strongly resisted suggestions that PTAR be repealed.
See Affiliates present united front, BROADCASTING, Dec. 13, 1982, at 37.
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turn off the set.-4
Local stations are thus "strengthened" by a rule that pre-
vents them from dissipating their profits on competition for
viewers. Following the Third Commandment means that
PTAR well serves the public interest.
4. Treat the symptoms, not the disease. The regulator who
obeys this Commandment maintains the illusion of achieving
progress without in fact making any hard choices or disruptive
changes. The reason for PTAR, we are told, is to reduce the
networks' market power, particularly because that market
power threatens local stations (and, hence, local programming)
and program producers (especially those that would prefer to
produce and syndicate first-run programs themselves).
But the rule does nothing to redress whatever bargaining
power the networks wield against stations or program suppli-
ers.5" ABC, CBS, and NBC enjoy their advantages, not because
they are permitted to offer programs in prime time, but be-
cause tremendous economies of scale are afforded any company
that can offer programs to all United States television house-
holds throughout most of the broadcast day and because the
FCC allocated spectrum space and regulated its use in a man-
ner that assured, at least through 1976, that over one-third of
United States households could receive no more than three
commercial television signals.m That is why three, and only
three, networks exist, a condition utterly unaffected by a dec-
ade of PTAR.
Yet, because the rule has been characterized as anti-network,
it retains appeal. To achieve real progress, rather than its illu-
sion, would require one to violate the Fifth Commandment.
5. Think small. One hallmark of cosmetic regulation is that
it responds to an issue in its most narrowly defined form. Obe-
dience to this Commandment reduces problems to "managea-
ble proportions," by which we frequently mean that no
54. So far as I know, no publicly available data prove or disprove these assertions.
They appear to be the most logical explanation for affiliates' support of PTAR and are
consistent with all available data of which I am aware. They also square with the
conclusions of Pearce in The Economic Consequences of the Federal Communications
Commission's Prime-Time Access Rule on the Broadcasting and Program Production
Industries (Sept. 1973).
55. On the bargaining relationships between networks and their affiliates, see
NEW TV NETwoRKs II, supra note 4, at 131-91, 231-92. On the bargaining relationships
between networks and their program suppliers, see id. at 445-716.
56. See supra notes 3-20 and accompanying text.
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regulatory response will seriously affect the status quo.
Although this also means that consumers (or, here, viewers)
may not derive any discernible benefits from regulation, Con-
gress may agree that the problem has been solved and the in-
dustry (to which most regulators look for long-term
employment) will suffer no major dislocations.
The Commission produced the prime time access rule, in
part, by first converting a large issue to a small one. The large
issue is how to avoid domination of the television industry by a
tightly knit, three-firm network oligopoly impervious to com-
petition by new entrants. As we have seen, one response to this
issue was to obey the Fourth Commandment and treat the
symptoms, rather than the cause, of network domination. The
FCC also further narrowed that issue to a much smaller one:
how to rectify the fact that the major networks were reaping
tremendous profits from the sale of commercials in prime time
while almost no one else in the television industry seemed to be
sharing the booty. As noted above, the PTAR is an excellent
response to that issue. That it also serves the public interest is
proved by invoking the Third Commandment and thereby con-
veniently ignoring the fact that the public interest is unaffected
by the distribution of the profits from television networking
among private corporations.
Thinking small is not a panacea.5 7 A narrow focus can yield a
picture of a one-legged caterpillar. When someone points this
out, the regulator should follow the Sixth Commandment.
6. Do not sacrifice expedience to principle. This Sixth Com-
mandment is a corollary of the first five. It requires faith and
commitment to obey steadfastly the first five Commandments
while all those about you are giggling or shrieking. Following
the Sixth Commandment also helps to get something accom-
plished. How else are we going to get pink butter on American
plates before the next election?
When the Commission promulgated PTAR, its terms prohib-
ited television stations from carrying more than the permitted
number of hours of acceptable programming during prime time
57. Nor is it always wrong. Sensible regulation often requires that one take a
cautious first step. Regulators properly should care not only about doing good but
also about avoiding the infliction of harm. Thinking small about the scope of the
problem and its causes, however, is almost certain to lead to an unresponsive remedy.
This is the flaw that underlies PTAR. Having defined the problem and its cause with
an unduly narrow focus, the FCC was excessively bold in the solution it chose.
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if offered by "any television network."5 Then, someone asked
the sixty-four dollar question: what is a "television network?" 9
The Commission faced a clear choice: was PTAR a generally
applicable principle concerning the extent to which network-
ing-the interconnection of local stations to achieve economies
of scale in producing and distributing programs and selling
commercial time-could be used to program local stations or
was it a measure to curb the size of ABC, CBS, and NBC? To
answer that question, the FCC invoked the Sixth
Commandment.
The Commission opined that it was not against networking
during prime time, it merely opposed networking during prime
time by ABC, CBS, or NBC. 6° Any firm could supply network
programs for an entire evening so long as it was not one of
these.61 In effect, it would not be expedient to treat PTAR as a
general regulatory policy toward television networking.
When asked whether PTAR does not abridge the right of
freedom of speech, by objecting to programs solely because of
their source, proponents of the rule will gladly explain how ex-
pedient it is to shut ABC, CBS, and NBC up for an hour.62 How
58. PTAR I, supra note 3, at 402 app. I. See also NEW TV NETWORKS I, supra note
3, at 454-59.
59. See In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
with Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 F.C.C.2d 318, para. 33 & app. 337 (1970).
60. Id. See also NEW TV NETWORKS I, supra note 3, at 458-59; infra note 61.
61. Technically, the rule restricts the program choices of affiliates of any "na-
tional television network." 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k). This is defined as a firm that "offers
an interconnected program service on a regular basis for 15 or more hours per week to
at least 25 affiliated television licensees in 10 or more States." 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(4)
(1983). The history of the adoption of PTAR shows, however, that the FCC intended
it would apply only to ABC, CBS, and NBC. See NEW TV NETWORKS I, supra note 3,
at 454-59. The Commission has construed one of its opinions concerning PTAR to
hold that this definition applies only to ABC, CBS, and NBC. See In re Amendment
of the Commission's Syndication and Financial Interest Rule in BC Docket No. 82-345,
FCC 82-300, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,959, para. 41, n.28 (1982)
(construing In re Christian Broadcasting Network, 87 F.C.C.2d 45 (1981)).
62. I do not argue here that PTAR is unconstitutional in the sense that most fed-
eral courts probably would so hold. Where the first amendment and broadcasting are
concerned, expedience may be enough to justify a regulation that is unconstitutional
as applied to other media. See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: First
Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123,1213-84 (1978).
Indeed, the Second Circuit has twice upheld PTAR in the face of a first amendment
challenge. See Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971);
NAITPD v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the constitutional
issues surrounding PTAR, see FCC, NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, AN ANALYSIS
OF TELEVISION PROGRAM PRODUCTION, ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION app. A (June
1980). I do mean to assert that consideration of the policies underlying the first
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else can we reduce network schedules, foster local and first-run
syndicated programming, and increase affiliates' profits? In
short, to attain a variety of politically expedient goals, it is nec-
essary to engage in a little bit of censorship.
PTAR also distinguishes among programs based on their con-
tent or format. As noted, children's programming and docu-
mentaries do not count (except on Saturdays) against the
networks' three-hour limits, nor do the Rose Bowl or the first
half hour of a regular network news broadcast. Why are view-
ers permitted to choose to watch the Olympics, but not "Hill
Street Blues," over "Family Feud?" Although first amend-
ment policies teach a regulator that all programs are equally
meritorious, expedience apparently requires us to hold some
programs more equally meritorious than others. 3
Were PTAR a cure-all tonic for the evils of networking, the
case for its extension-to daytime and late night periods as well
as to other major full-time networks like Home Box Office, En-
tertainment and Sports Programming Network and Cable
News Network-would be irresistible and irrefutable. Every
asserted benefit that accrues from kicking ABC, CBS, and NBC
out of the 7-8 p.m. slot would also be achieved by gagging them
(and their new competitors) from 2-3 p.m. and 2-3 a.m. as well.
But extension has not occurred and will not; it would not be
expedient.
Apparently, it is useful to obey the Sixth Commandment
without ever saying so. One searches the literature on PTAR
in vain for a justification of the rule as written. PTAR in fact
forbids CBS, but not HBO or an independent television station,
from broadcasting "M*A*S*H," but not (unless it is Saturday) a
documentary on the Korean War, from 7-8 p.m. It does not,
however, forbid CBS from broadcasting "M*A*S*H" from 2-3
p.m. or after 11 p.m. Now, what is the point of that? Nobody
knows (or those who do are not telling). No one defends the
prime time access rule that wallows in the Code of Federal
Regulations because no one can do so. Rather, PTAR is de-
fended as a rule preventing networks from encroaching on
their affiliates' entire prime time schedules and providing in-
dependent stations an opportunity to compete.6 Such a de-
amendment may properly affect a regulatory choice even though judges would not
hold that the Constitution forecloses certain options.
63. See supra note 62.
64. See, e.g., PTAR key to survival for local TV stations, supra note 53.
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scription completely ignores the reality of PTAR, a reality born
of a series of expedient, unprincipled exceptions, qualifications
and compromises.
V
The Demise of PTAR
To examine closely the principles reflected in PTAR is to ex-
pose its indefensibility. As a matter of principle, the rule
clashes irreconcilably with usual anti-censorship policies, fur-
thers no general goal of network regulation, and entirely disre-
gards viewers' welfare. Whether a station may broadcast a
program from 7-8 p.m. depends on who financed it, where it
was broadcast earlier, and its content and format. As a matter
of pragmatism, the rule does nothing to reduce entry barriers
confronting potential new networks, to stimulate competition
among existing networks, or to increase the number of choices
available to viewers. 5 Indeed, PTAR rests squarely on the
premise that to allow stations to compete vigorously for view-
ers' attention is antithetical to the public interest, and is fre-
quently defended on the grounds that it increases the welfare
of station licensees, as though the public somehow owes these
corporations homage for having received (or, more likely,
purchased from one who received) an unrestricted government
monopoly without charge or obligation.
If PTAR is as misguided as I have claimed, why do so many
in the television industry support it? For the same reason I
would support exempting from the federal income tax all per-
sons whose last name begins with a "K." PTAR supporters are
wealthier with the rule than without it. Network affiliates in
major markets can broadcast cheap programming knowing that
their principal competitors will not be able to lure away view-
ers with more expensive fare. Independent stations, which are
permitted to air network reruns, relish the opportunity to pit
these repeats against fresh low-budget game shows,6 although
they have not been sufficiently numerous or strong to over-
65. That these should be the principal criteria for assessing the utility of regula-
tion of commercial television networks' structure and behavior is argued in MISREGU-
LATING TELEVISION, supra note 3, at 21-30.
66. See Petition for Rule Making of Chronicle Broadcasting Co., FCC 81-274 (July
17, 1981). Chronicle Broadcasting Company reports that it surveyed all access period
programming in every fifth of the top 50 markets for November 1980. Virtually all
the programming appearing on independent stations was off-network syndicated fare.
See id. at 17 & app. 1.
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whelm affiliates in this period. Producers of network prime
time programs have largely been shut out of the access period
but the rule has also bolstered their market by solidifying their
customers' (the dominant networks') hold over the program
distribution market for the remainder of the evening.67 And
producers of day time network game shows have found the ac-
cess period a virtual gold mine.8
Most industry members, therefore, believe they will suffer
significant financial losses if PTAR is repealed. The only rea-
son for them to oppose PTAR is on the principle that one
should not profit from the arbitrary censorship of another. In-
dustry members know from experience that one who espouses
that principle can hope, at best, to receive a special Emmy
Award for statesmanship twenty-five years after being written
off by Wall Street analysts.
Why has the FCC not repealed PTAR? Part of the answer is
that a majority of the Commission has not yet been able to
break the six Commandments for inept regulation.
Another reason is that FCC leaders will realize no gain from
repeal. Like any other group of politicians, FCC commissioners
know that if you rob Peter to pay Paul the only thing you can
confidently expect is Paul's undying fealty. Three Peters seek-
ing repeal will not be able to drown out hundreds of Pauls con-
gratulating the FCC for its fine statesmanship. This is
particularly true if those truly harmed by the rule are televi-
sion viewers deprived of the opportunity to choose what they
prefer. Since some get what they prefer anyway, they are un-
likely to complain. Others, who might prefer more network or
syndicated off-network programs, often may not perceive that
they might obtain such fare by turning the dial if the rule per-
mitted stations to compete by offering such programs.
Finally, just as PTAR can be defended as a limit on the awe-
some power of the dominant networks, so can its repeal be
characterized as a sell-out to those entrenched special interests.
67. Due to PTAR, we do not know whether viewer and advertiser demand for
network programs is strong enough to support a four-hour prime time network sched-
ule for all three networks all week long. Prior to the rule, it had not been. See PTAR
I, supra note 3, at 395. However, a three-hour schedule has proved highly saleable.
Affiliates rarely fail to carry network prime time offerings. See NEW TV NETWoRKS
II, supra note 4, at 262-63. Consequently, producers of prime time network programs
have a very high and steady demand for their output in the hours unencumbered by
PTAR.
68. See NEW TV NETwoRs II, supra note 4, at 413-21, 736-40.
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Explaining to those in the political arena that PTAR is an anti-
viewer device that functions as a cartel agreement among sta-
tions in large markets would surely be a difficult task. At-
tempts to repeal PTAR are likely to be portrayed as yet
another ploy to shower gifts on the dominant networks.
For all these reasons. PTAR has become a bit of a sacred cow.
The last three FCC chairmen have proclaimed loudly and fre-
quently the desirability of reducing governmental oversight of
the daily operations of the TV industry. They have employed
different terms to describe what they were about-"reregula-
tion," "deregulation," and "unregulation" '69 (thus narrowing
the next chair's options to the equally distasteful "disregula-
tion" or "antiregulation")-but all have largely practiced what
they preached. None, however, has directed his revolutionary
fervor at PTAR.
What, then, can be done to rid television of the PTAR
plague? Nothing needs to be done except to wait. Barriers to
the creation of new, full-scale, nationally interconnected net-
works are falling rapidly.70 When fifty, sixty, or seventy per-
cent of United States television households find they can
choose among five, eight, or ten other networks (or watch a
videocassette) between 7 and 8 p.m., 71 affiliates of ABC, CBS,
and NBC will suddenly rediscover the value of competing for
viewers' attention unencumbered by artificial program restric-
tions. They will clamour for PTAR's repeal. At that time, a
new Commandment will be revealed: When your six hundred
most successful licensees shout "Repeal!," ask not "Why?," but
only "Today or tomorrow?"
69. See Krasnow, Broadcast Deregulation: Moving 'Back to Basics,' LEGAL TIMES,
May 21, 1984, at 10.
70. See MISREGULATING TELEVISION, supra note 3, at 17-19. See also Krat-
tenmaker & Metzger, FCC Regulatory Authority Over Commercial Television Net-
works: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 403, 464-86 (1982).
71. To use only cable television as an example, at least 17 advertiser-supported
cable networks now exist. See NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, CABLE
TELEVISION DEVELOPMENTS (Mar. 1984). Several other pay cable networks also oper-
ate. Id. Over 35% of U.S. television households subscribe to a cable system. Id. None
of these is affected by PTAR, which applies only to "licensees of a commercial televi-
sion station." 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k). The evidence to date is already rather clear that
cable television subscription and viewing adversely affects the audience size of the
dominant networks. See Quantifying the network erosion, BROADCASTING, Nov. 22,
1982, at 59-60.
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